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Evidence suggests that a regular and reliable transfer of cash to households with
orphaned and vulnerable children has a strong and positive effect on child
outcomes. However, conditional cash transfers are considered by some as
particularly intrusive and the question on whether or not to apply conditions to
cash transfers is an issue of controversy. Contributing to policy debates on the
appropriateness of conditions, this article sets out to investigate the overall buy-
in of conditions by different stakeholders and to identify pathways that
contribute to an acceptability of conditions. The article draws on data from a
cluster-randomized trial of a community-led cash transfer programme in
Manicaland, eastern Zimbabwe. An endpoint survey distributed to 5167
households assessed community members’ acceptance of conditions and 35 in-
depth interviews and 3 focus groups with a total of 58 adults and 4 youth
examined local perceptions of conditions. The study found a significant and
widespread acceptance of conditions primarily because they were seen as fair
and a proxy for good parenting or guardianship. In a socio-economic context
where child grants are not considered a citizen entitlement, community
members and cash transfer recipients valued the conditions associated with
these grants. The community members interpreted the fulfilment of the
conditions as a proxy for achievement and merit, enabling them to participate
rather than sit back as passive recipients of aid. Although conditions have a
paternalistic undertone and engender the sceptics’ view of conditions being
pernicious and even abominable, it is important to recognize that community
members, when given the opportunity to participate in programme design and
implementation, can take advantage of conditions and appropriate them in a
way that helps them manage change and overcome the social divisiveness or
conflict that otherwise may arise when some people are identified to benefit and
others not.
Keywords Cash transfers, conditions, community acceptability, orphaned children, social
protection
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits
unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
 The Author 2013
Health Policy and Planning 2013;1–9
doi:10.1093/heapol/czt060
1
 Health Policy and Planning Advance Access published September 9, 2013
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 at London School of Econom
ics and Political Science on O
ctober 2, 2013
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
KEY MESSAGES
 Soft conditions in a community-led cash transfer programme can be socially accepted.
 Soft conditions can stimulate more active community participation and help overcome social divisiveness.
 Through participation community members can mould and shape cash transfer programmes in ways that benefit them
and manage change.
Introduction
Cash transfers are emerging as key interventions for the social
protection of vulnerable children in the global South. Rigorous
evaluations of conditional cash transfer (CCT) and uncondi-
tional cash transfer (UCT) programmes demonstrate that both
approaches, through the provision of a regular and reliable
income to vulnerable households, can improve the health and
developmental outcomes of children (Handa and Davis 2006;
Adato and Bassett 2009; Lagarde et al. 2009; Arnold et al. 2011).
Yet, the question on whether or not to condition a cash transfer
remains largely unanswered and hotly debated, often guided by
the underlying values of donors, government staff, policy actors
and academics (Freeland 2007; Schu¨ring 2010). In this article,
we seek to contribute to the policy debate on the appropriate-
ness of conditions by bringing to the fore perspectives of cash
transfer recipients and other local stakeholders. More specific-
ally, and in our interest to examine how local communities
appropriate development interventions to fit their social land-
scape, we examine pathways to community acceptability of
conditions in a cash transfer trial in Manicaland, Zimbabwe.
CCTs were first rolled out in Latin America where countries in
the mid-1990s started to experiment with conditional welfare
in response to a region-wide slowdown in economic activity
and growing poverty. As suggested by the name, CCTs involve
the transfer of cash to individuals or households who show
some level of behavioural compliance, such as the uptake of
health and educational services. The goal of CCTs is to increase
the demand for government services that invest in the human
capital of future generations. CCTs are therefore favoured in
regions where government services are in good supply and
where individuals are either (1) unaware of the benefits of
using these services; (2) need the bargaining power to change
behaviours or (3) presented with opportunity costs that make
these services unobtainable. A few recent cash transfer trials in
sub-Saharan Africa have found CCTs to outperform UCTs,
particularly in relation to improving the school attendance and
performance of marginalized children (Baird et al. 2011; Akresh
et al. 2013). In Mexico, Barber and Gertler (2010) found
conditions to have the potential to empower beneficiaries,
women in particular, by enabling them, through access to
information and resources, to demand their right for health
care. Conditions also help cement and increase performance
indicators, making conditions attractive to donors, policy
makers and politicians.
Critics of cash transfer programmes have raised concerns
about the social divisiveness, conflict and jealousy that may
arise when some households are targeted and not others, even
though they are considered poor and deserving locally
(MacAuslan and Riemenschneider 2011; Ellis 2012). With
regard to conditions, three perspectives on their
inappropriateness dominate the field. First, and pertaining to
the impact of conditions on social relations, Saucedo Delgado
(2013) found, in the context of rural Mexico, that conditions
contributed to a gendering of household interactions with
government services—adding an extra burden to women. Some
commentators warn that the failure of CCTs to redress gender
roles and transfer power to recipients may result in CCTs
perpetuating social inequalities (Forde et al. 2011). Second,
concerns have also been raised about the symbolism of
conditions. Nicholas Freeland (2007) argues that the term
‘conditional’ is imprecise and a perpetuation of the paternalistic
mindset that took shape following the structural adjustment
phase. He goes on to argue that conditionalities project know-
how from the state and fail to consider the value of a
partnership between grant providers and recipients. Freeland
(2007, p. 77) believes that conditions send a conflicting
message: ‘on the one hand, [a government] proudly tell its
citizens that social protection is their basic ‘‘human right’’; and
then, on the other hand, threaten to deprive the neediest
among them of that very ‘‘right’’ if they fail to meet certain
‘‘conditions’’ ’. Relatedly, stakeholders may find CCTs unfair,
and even counterproductive, if sanctions are enforced to the
most vulnerable. Yet, a lack of sanctions renders the whole
concept of conditions meaningless. This suggests a need for
conditions to act as guidance, best practice or achievement aims
(i.e. positive motivation) rather than barriers, or a manifest-
ation of failure (with punishment). Third, conditions increase
the demand for services, yet in many parts of sub-Saharan
Africa, health and educational services are facing significant
constraints, which, combined with the added costs and
complexities in monitoring compliance of conditions, has
made some commentators question the usefulness of condi-
tionalities in sub-Saharan African cash transfer schemes
(Devereux et al. 2005; Schubert and Slater 2006).
These critiques and challenges highlight some very real
concerns about conditions. In response, we set out to investi-
gate the comparative effectiveness and appropriateness of CCT
and UCT through a community randomized controlled trial in
Manicaland, Zimbabwe. In terms of effectiveness, we found
that both approaches increased school attendance among
orphaned and vulnerable children and that none of the
approaches managed to increase vaccination uptake
(Robertson et al. 2013). The lack of impact on vaccination
uptake can possibly be explained—although this still needs to
be investigated—by a ceiling effect (i.e. uptake was close to
100%) as most children either received vaccinations at birth or
through mobile distribution units, which were unaffected by
the transfers. Conditions did, however, increase the percentage
of children with birth registration, suggesting that conditions
were somewhat more effective (Robertson et al. 2013).
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Contributing to debates on the appropriateness of conditions,
the aims of this article are 2-fold. First, to investigate the
overall buy-in among the general community of conditions and,
second, to contextualize these findings by elaborating on local
perspectives of conditions, identifying perceptions and path-
ways that contribute to a community acceptability of
conditions.
Methods
We draw on quantitative and qualitative data from a cluster-
randomized trial of a community-led cash transfer programme
in Manicaland, eastern Zimbabwe. The intervention was funded
by the Programme of Support1 for the Zimbabwe National
Action Plan for Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (UNICEF
Zimbabwe), the World Bank (through the Partnership for Child
Development) and the Wellcome Trust. It was implemented in
partnership between the Biomedical Research and Training
Institute (BRTI), the Catholic Relief Services in Zimbabwe and
the Diocese of Mutare Community Care Programme
(DOMCCP).
Study location and the cash transfer programme
Manicaland is poor and most residents make a living through
subsistence farming. Prior to the economic and political
instability, Zimbabwe had one of the highest literacy rates in
Africa, particularly among women, enhancing their orientation
towards participating in development programmes (Egbo 2000).
Although HIV incidence has been declining (Gregson et al.
2010; Halperin et al. 2011), HIV and AIDS continue to be a
problem, particularly for children who resume caring respon-
sibilities or are left orphaned (Campbell et al. 2010; Nyamukapa
et al. 2010). To respond to the needs of the many orphaned and
vulnerable children in Manicaland, a feasibility study was
conducted to investigate the desirability of a cash transfer
programme (cf. DD and CRS 2007). This included meetings
with community members to discuss whether they would like
conditions or not. Those consulted generally favoured condi-
tions. Rather than imposing a set of conditions, the nature of
the conditions included in the CCT arm were derived from
initial consultations with a group of community members and
other stakeholders. The conditions were obtaining birth certifi-
cates, keeping children up-to-date with vaccinations and
attendance at a growth-monitoring clinic twice a year, keeping
school attendance above 90% of days each month and attend-
ing parenting-skills classes.
Informed by the feasibility study, the cash transfer pro-
gramme was designed to promote community engagement,
with community-based cash transfer committees (CTCs) play-
ing an active role in administering the programme (including
community mobilization, beneficiary selection process, cash
distributions, verification of compliance with conditions). To
establish the CTCs, each community was divided into five areas,
or villages, and the person from each village getting most votes
was elected to become a member of the local community
committee. The cash transfer programme commenced imple-
mentation in July 2009 across 30 communities.
Households eligible for cash transfers were identified through
a two-stage process designed to involve community members
and also to avoid bias in the selection process (see also
Robertson et al. 2012). In the first stage, household census data,
verified through a community consultation exercise, were used
to establish which households in each study community met
the eligibility criteria. In the second stage, communities (and,
thus, their constituent eligible households) were allocated to
either a control, CCT or UCT group through a random process
conducted at public meetings. Through this process, a total of
2844 eligible households were allocated to receive cash transfers
and a further 1199 households to the control arm of the study.
The selected eligible households received bi-monthly grants of
US$18 plus an extra US$4 per child living in the household
(up to a maximum of three children).
To help the CCT recipients meet the conditions they were issued
with ‘compliance’ cards. Service providers signed these cards
during service access. They were also brought to the pay points,
along with other documents such as birth certificates, child health
cards and receipts for the payment of school fees. The cards and
documents were checked before cash was disbursed. If a house-
hold provided a good reason for failing to meet one or more
conditions, this reason was verified by the CTC. If, after a 6-month
grace period with no repercussions for non-compliance, the
household still did not comply with the conditions, support from
DOMCCP was offered and the household was assigned a compli-
ance buddy (local volunteer) to help meet the conditions. If after
another 4 months the household remained in default, the policy
was to reduce the transfer by 10%, and, after 6 months of default,
the compliance buddy assumed control of the household’s
transfers. Once it met the conditions, the household would
receive its full transfer and the compliance buddy would be
withdrawn. Reflecting the softness of the conditions, the short
follow-up period over which compliance with conditions were
assessed, and the adequate support provided by compliance
buddies, no recipients had their funds withheld during the time of
the trial because of non-compliance.
Quantitative data
Trial endpoints were evaluated using data from a follow-up
survey administered in May 2011 to eligible beneficiary house-
holds in all areas, including those in the control areas. The
survey was also administered to a smaller sample (n¼ 1124) of
non-eligible households. To assess local acceptability of the
transfers, the survey asked household representatives whether
they agreed with the following statements: ‘In the cash transfer
programme, there were too many conditions’ and ‘In the cash
transfer programme, the conditions were appropriate’. We
present these data for eligible and non-eligible households
across all three arms of the trial.
Qualitative data
To contextualize the survey data, a qualitative study was
conducted, drawing on the perspectives of 58 adults and 4
youth (age 14–21). The study participants contributed to 35
structured interviews and 3 focus group discussions. A mix of
stakeholders was selected randomly from a stratified list of
programme stakeholders and recruited by Shona-speaking re-
searchers from the BRTI in consultation with community guides.
As detailed in Table 1, the study participants included 24 key
informants, local government employees, CTC and DOMCCP
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members, selected for their involvement in implementing the
programme, 24 direct beneficiaries of the CCT (5 adults and 3
youths) and UCT (15 adults and 1 youth) arms as well as 14 non-
beneficiaries. The sample size was determined partly by progress
towards saturation, reached approximately after five interviews
per adult interviewee group, and partly by the amount of time and
resources available to conduct the interviews. The latter meant
that we were only able to interview four youths.
Interviews (with the exception of one English language inter-
view) were conducted in the local Shona language by experienced
qualitative researchers. The individual interviews lasted an
average of 40 min, whereas the group interviews took an average
of 94 min. The topic guide used covered themes such as local
understandings of the programme, cash spending, conditions,
changes the programme has instigated, impact and local barriers
to programme success. Interviews were translated and transcribed
into English and imported into a qualitative software package
(Atlas.Ti) for coding and more in-depth examination. A total of 90
codes were generated from coding the transcripts. As this article
reports on the topic of cash transfers conditions, we only report
on the 13 codes, or basic themes, that shed light on our
quantitative findings. As illustrated by Table 2, these basic
themes were arranged thematically (Attride-Stirling 2001),
involving a grouping together of themes into higher order and
more interpretative organizing and global themes. This process,
and by analysing all the transcripts together, enabled us to move
beyond description of individuals’ accounts and their individua-
lized personal experiences of the programme (vis-a`-vis their
context), and instead map out some of the more prevalent
experiences and perceptions as reported by the informants. To
illustrate their prevalence, we have in Table 2 included a tally
(percentage) of how many interviews discussed a particular
theme. We will systematically discuss the basic and organizing
themes emerging from this analysis.
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Imperial
College Research Ethics Committee (ICREC_9_3_10), the BRTI’s
Institutional Review Board (AP81/09) and the Medical Research
Council of Zimbabwe (MRCZ/A/1518). Informed and written
consent was gathered from all participants with the agreement
that their identities would not be revealed. Pseudonyms have
therefore been used throughout.
Results
The findings of this study must be read against the background
that this cash transfer programme was community-led and
directed. Its design, including the ‘soft’ conditions, was
developed through community consultations and a feasibility
study. Community-elected CTC members took an active role in
administering the programme such as playing a key role in the
selection of beneficiaries and in monitoring compliance.
Elsewhere, we have highlighted the importance of integrating
cash transfer programmes into a community context to achieve
acceptability of cash transfers and maximize impact (Skovdal
et al. 2013). It is against this context we now present our
findings.
Community acceptability of conditions
In total, 5167 households were interviewed at follow-up. Of
these, 4043 were eligible at baseline for the CT programme and
1124 were not eligible. Table 3 shows a general and widespread
acceptance of conditions in our programme areas. In fact,
eligible households in the CCT areas were the most likely to
think that the conditions were appropriate (92.2% compared
with 74.6 and 70.9% among eligible households in the UCT and
control areas, respectively, chi-squared test P< 0.001).
However, the eligible households in the CCT areas were also
somewhat more likely to think there were too many conditions
(7.6% of eligible CCT households thought this compared with
5.1 and 3.6% among eligible UCT and control households,
respectively, chi-squared test P< 0.001).
Among eligible households, there were no significant differ-
ences between perceptions of the conditions by sex of
respondent—men and women were equally likely to perceive
the conditions as appropriate and to agree that there were too
many conditions (Table 4).
Local perceptions of conditions
Shedding light on this overwhelming acceptability of condi-
tions, informants spoke of how conditions entice behaviours
that are locally embraced and facilitate social accountability of
‘free’ money (see Table 2).
Conditions believed to encourage ‘good’ behaviours
Interviewees and focus group participants often spoke about the
potential of conditions to entice and facilitate more socially
desirable behaviours that ensure good use of money and
ultimately benefit vulnerable children. Cementing this perspec-
tive was a commonly held view that conditions help circumvent
a misuse of money.
I think the conditions were good, receiving money without
any conditions doesn’t work because you won’t pay school
fees or do anything constructive with the money. It is better
to have conditions. (Anashe, female, caregiver benefiting
from CCT)
This view was held by all kinds of stakeholders, including
those benefiting from CCTs and UCTs, despite the fact that even
the unconditional arm increased educational attendance
(Robertson et al. 2013). It was therefore not an expression of
stigma or jealousy, but rooted in a common recognition of what
good parenting is and a common goal to support children. For
example, to children and youth benefiting from the cash
transfers, conditions presented them with a reassurance that
Table 1 Summary of study participants
Individual
interviews
Focus
groups
Total
number of
interviewsAdults Youth Adults
Key informants 15 0 1 (9 people) 16
Cash transfer
beneficiaries
6 1 1 (9 people) 8
CCT beneficiaries 5 3 0 8
Non-beneficiaries 5 0 1 (9 people) 6
Total number
of people
31 4 3 (27 people) 38
62
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they were to benefit from the programme and that the money
would not be spent frivolously by their parents.
The conditions are good, because had it been that money is
just given without them, parents are the ones who would
be benefiting and not children. They will be using the
money on what they want only. So if they are told the
money has conditions it will be clear to them that the
money is not for them alone. (Dzingai, 15-year-old boy
benefiting from CCT)
Also alluded to by Dzingai, is the notion that conditions can
strengthen the bargaining power of household members whose
interests are closely aligned with the objectives of the programme
Table 2 Thematic network: local perceptions of conditions
Basic theme (percentage of interviews discussing a theme) Organizing themes Global themes
Conditions avoid misuse of money (24) Ensure good use of money Conditions believed
to encourage
‘good’ behaviours
Conditions ensure children benefit (21)
Conditions help people set priorities (26) Conditions facilitate learning and
behaviour changeConditions sensitize people to the needs of children (26)
Conditions encourage behaviour change (10)
Some people fail to comply to conditions (21) People recognize there are limitations to
conditionsPeople with conditions have little spending freedom (10)
Poor household dynamics and situations can take priority (29)
Money spent inappropriately if there are no conditions (24) There is a perception of a need to monitor
use of money
Conditions facilitate
social
accountabilityDifficult to monitor cash transfers if no conditions (14)
There are consequences for those who fail to comply (16) Conditions facilitate a sense of ownership,
social responsibility and participationGetting ‘free’ cash comes with a responsibility (21)
Community members take an active role in monitoring compliance (26)
Table 4 Gender differences in community acceptability
Control arm UCT arm CCT arm
Female
respondents
Male
respondents
Female
respondents
Male
respondents
Female
respondents
Male
respondents
The conditions were appropriate Agree 70.0% 68.8% 75.6% 73.1% 93.0% 90.5%
Disagree 8.1% 6.3% 12.2% 16.6% 4.9% 6.3%
Don’t know 21.9% 24.9% 12.3% 10.3% 2.0% 3.2%
N 807 205 1052 271 891 221
There were too many conditions Agree 3.5% 4.9% 4.9% 4.8% 7.3% 9.5%
Disagree 74.0% 67.8% 82.0% 83.8% 89.9% 86.9%
Don’t know 22.5% 27.3% 13.1% 11.4% 2.8% 3.6%
N 808 205 1051 271 891 222
Table 3 Community acceptability of conditions by household eligibility status and trial arm
Eligible households Non-eligible households
Control UCT CCT Control UCT CCT
The conditions were appropriate Agree 70.9% 74.6% 92.2% 82.8% 69.4% 83.5%
Disagree 7.9% 13.2% 5.4% 9.2% 10.0% 11.1%
Don’t know 21.3% 12.2% 2.4% 8.0% 20.6% 5.4%
N 1115 1451 1247 436 389 297
There were too many conditions Agree 3.6% 5.1% 7.6% 5.3% 3.3% 3.4%
Disagree 74.0% 81.5% 89.1% 86.2% 74.6% 90.2%
Don’t know 22.4% 13.4% 3.3% 8.5% 22.1% 6.4%
N 1116 1450 1248 436 389 297
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and the implementing agency. For Dzingai, conditions helped
ensure that the interests of the child were prioritized. Similarly,
Kuasa, a CTC member, spoke about how conditions may reduce
the likelihood of men using the money to their own benefit, and
providing women, children and community members with the
opportunity to question their use of the money.
I recommend money with conditions than without condi-
tions because people will be compelled to improve the
livelihoods of their households unlike money without
conditions where people will just use the money for
whatever they want. There are some men who can take
the money and go and marry a second wife but his children
will be suffering in the household just because the money
did not come with conditions. No one will dare to ask him
what he did with the money if there are no conditions.
(Kuasa, female, CTC member)
In addition to sending a message about how best to spend the
money, conditions were said to facilitate learning and encourage
behaviour change. A number of informants, for example, spoke
about how conditions encouraged recipients to think about what
is important for children and to prioritize their needs.
There is a big difference between the two groups because
the group that was receiving money with conditions got a
lot of knowledge unlike the other group. Like if you take
your child for vaccination, then your child will have good
health. If your children have birth certificates, then they
have a good life ahead of them. If you have a national
identity card, you are a free citizen in your country. The
households without conditions just spend the money they
were receiving on anything they wanted without anyone
asking any questions. Some households did not even send
their children to school. It’s called for a wise parent to send
their children to school. (Edzai, female non-benefiting
community member)
People got informed on the importance of caring for the
children . . . it is good because it makes people think about
their children. (Ruko, male, CTC member)
The idea that conditions help parents become ‘wise’ was
frequently mentioned in the interviews. This was particularly
the case when conditions helped change the attitudes and
behaviours of parents who were believed to engage in poor
parenting practices. One such example is the perceived
changing attitude of people within the apostolic faith who, in
this context and for religious reasons, have a poor record of
taking their children to hospital. Although some increases in
uptake of multi-dose vaccines not given at birth were observed,
these were not statistically significant (Robertson et al. 2013). It
was however believed that Apostolics in particular benefited
from the programme.
We are noticing an improvement on the issue of the
Apostolics and their use of hospital services. Some are
responding positively and at least they now know that
children are supposed to go to the hospital. (Rindi, male,
local government employee)
Not all families were believed to successfully comply with the
conditions, primarily because of the self-interest of a few
individuals. Raviro, a CTC member, was of the impression that
a few men in the community used the money to go drinking,
neglecting the needs of children in their household.
There are some men in the community who had difficulty
in understanding the programme. These men do not work,
they just stay at home. So when the money came, they took
the money and used it to meet their own needs instead of
using it for the benefit of their children. Instead of paying
for school fees and buying uniforms, the men went
drinking or paid off their own debts. (Raviro, male, CTC
member)
For other benefiting households, their sheer deprivation (e.g.
lack of food) meant they struggled to prioritize their children’s
schooling and thus meeting the conditions.
While conditions were described as playing an important role
in guiding parents to make decisions that improve the health
and development outcomes of their children, it is difficult to
attribute improvements in health and development outcomes to
conditionalities alone. Rather than being the conditions them-
selves that bring about this change, it could be a combination
of increased awareness and parents’ natural inclination to do
the best for their children. For example, one UCT recipient said:
‘I received money without conditions [. . .] when I received the
money I went straight to pay school fees for my children. I
didn’t want them to miss school’. Indeed, our effectiveness
study found only small differences in the effects of CCT and
UCT programmes on the school attendance of vulnerable
children (Robertson et al. 2013). Without undermining the
importance of conditions in facilitating learning and a focus on
children’s needs, it is arguably the perception of the added
benefits of conditions as outlined in this section, as well as the
counselling and support that went with, what, in practice, were
‘soft’ conditions, that contributed to this overwhelming buy-in
and appreciation of conditions.
Conditions facilitate social accountability
Another pathway to community acceptability of conditions
pertains to the opportunities for social accountability that
conditions present. There was, for example, a general belief,
deepened by the perception that UCTs are more likely to be
misappropriated, that the money distributed needs to be
monitored, and that conditions make this more feasible.
The difference is that, if a person is getting cash without
conditions, the person can use the money to do whatever
they want or even misuse the money because they will say
there is not going to be a follow-up. (Pepukayi, 21-year-old
male household head benefiting from CCT)
The best way forward is to have conditions. They prevent
people from doing the wrong things because, where there
are conditions, they help in monitoring. If there were no
conditions, you wouldn’t be monitoring anything and there
would be no way of knowing if the programme was really
working. (Shamu, male, representative from implementing
agency)
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The fact that CCT recipients, through a monitoring system,
were held accountable for the money they received, appeared to
make it easier for non-beneficiaries to justify and accept that
some community members got money. Conditions, in the
context of this community-led cash transfer initiative, provided
community members with the opportunity to participate in the
monitoring of the programme.
People would say we don’t want to see people buying
snacks [. . .]. That money should be spent effectively. People
would just say this in passing to those people who would
have received the money. This was not said with harsh
words but it was said in a nice way to encourage people to
be more responsible. You say it nicely in a social way so
that they understand. (Zira, male, non-benefiting commu-
nity member)
Although such social control and regulation can be problem-
atic, no cash transfer beneficiaries reported being hassled by
community members, suggesting that community members,
like Zira, articulated their support and encouragement in a
sensitive way.
Some cash transfer recipients were surprised by the oppor-
tunity to be given ‘free’ money and felt that one way to give
back, or work for the money, was to respect the programme
aims and spend the money accordingly.
What surprised me is that people give you money to use
which you didn’t work for. I said to myself ‘‘I will use the
money appropriately.’’ (Tinashe, female, caregiver benefit-
ing from UCT)
They effectively took conditions, or the social control, as an
opportunity to actively participate in the programme. Getting
‘free’ money comes with a responsibility to use the money as
intended, a recognition most cash transfer recipients endorsed.
It’s a good thing to have conditions. If people are getting
money without working for it, they should use the money
properly. The advantage is that people know the use of the
money they are getting, like paying school fees for their
children and sending their children to clinic. So far I have
not seen any disadvantages of the conditions. (Pepukayi,
21-year-old male household head benefiting from CCT)
Although some cash transfer recipients complained about
getting insufficient funds to meet the conditions (the spending
freedom of recipients was dependent on the cost of their
children’s education and the availability of household assets),
others, like Anashe who had a little spare money, commented
on how the programme enabled decision making.
If you have conditions you are given guidelines, you use the
money appropriately [. . .] if you use the money appropri-
ately then you can use the rest in your own way and relax.
(Anashe, female, caregiver benefiting from CCT)
Many cash transfer recipients who did find themselves with
some spare money joined savings groups with the intention of
investing in household assets, such as buying livestock or
poultry. Through such activities, advice and encouragement,
recipients took an active role in ensuring programme goals were
met, projecting themselves as active participants in the pro-
gramme as opposed to passive recipients of aid.
We discuss issues to do with cash transfers and how we are
using this money, advising each other to use the money
properly and not abuse the money but to use it on our
children. (Gamba, male, caregiver benefiting from UCT)
Discussion
The findings presented in this article point to a widespread
acceptance of conditions in the context of a community-led
cash transfer initiative. We identified two key pathways leading
to this acceptance. One, conditions were viewed positively and
seen as reasonable, a proxy for good parenting and guardian-
ship. Two, social recognition of the need to be held accountable
for the ‘free’ money provided recipients and community
members with an action pathway as contributing players
rather than passive recipients. In effect, the conditions made
explicit a social contract between the beneficiaries, their
community and the implementing agencies—recognizing all
stakeholders, including recipients, as actors in the programme.
This not only improved the bargaining power of women and
children, enabling households to prioritize the needs of
children, it may also have helped recipient households over-
come the stigma attached to welfare payments.
Our experiences suggest that conditions can, if designed by
and implemented through local community structures, be
beneficial and overcome the social divisiveness or conflict that
may arise when some people are identified to benefit and
others not. In fact, our experiences suggest that conditions, in
an oddly contradictory way to the meaning of the word,
provided community members with an incentive and oppor-
tunity to actively engage with the programme—empowering
them as actors. Furthermore, our sanctions were enabling and
did not, in fact, remove the cash transfer, but diverted it to a
responsible buddy, altering control and not receipt. If the
conditions themselves were not viewed positively, for example,
if people felt the programme was imposing ‘hard’ and unfair
sanctions, we might have witnessed a different outcome.
As it is the most vulnerable and hard-to-reach children who
will suffer if parents fail to meet the conditions, there is a need
for a discussion on the kind of sanctions that one would impose
on those who fail to meet the conditions as well as the meaning
of conditions. As detailed earlier in the article, our conditions
were ‘soft’ and agreed upon by a group of community members
at the design stage. For our informants, the conditions
cemented a social contract between all actors, contributing to
a sense of accountability. As such, and reflecting Scott and
Marshall’s (2005) definition of social sanction, we found that
the conditions did not have to be ‘hard’ and enforced to have
an impact. The anticipation of being socially recognized as a
good parent (reward) or the off-chance of being withdrawn
from the programme (punishment), meant that people con-
formed to the conditions. Although people’s perceptions of a
cash transfer programme may change if, and when, they realize
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that the conditions are not enforced or if the organization
enforces conditions in a hard-lined manner, it is the social
control of fair conditions, sparked by community involvement
and a community-wide sensitization to the needs of orphaned
and vulnerable children that appear to have been in force in
this programme, facilitating agency, participation and buy-in.
It is also possible that the overwhelming support for condi-
tions, fuelled by community perceptions that unconditional
transfers are likely to be misappropriated, also contributed to an
implicit social contract between UCT recipients and community
members. Indeed, as outlined in this article, UCT beneficiaries
also sensed the need to spend the money responsibly, and our
effectiveness study found both CCTs and UCTs to promote
educational outcomes (Robertson et al. 2013). Gaarder (2012)
recently discussed, albeit without empirical support, the poten-
tial of social sanctions or peer monitoring, to act in a similar
way as conditions, underlining the importance of exploring this
potential further.
As we sought to map out the stock of symbolic resources and
meanings used by our informants to make sense of conditions,
the qualitative study did not pursue a more detailed analysis of
individual experiences or patterns between the different types
of respondents participating in the study. Another limitation of
this study pertains to response bias. We recognize that some
participants may have provided us with desirable responses to
show their gratefulness and did not want to challenge the
programme out of fear for it being withdrawn. To mitigate the
risk of surveyor-induced responses we made sure the survey
team (researchers from BRTI) was not involved in delivering
the intervention (the responsibility of DOMCCP), and that we
only used trained and experienced research assistants who were
able to establish rapport and openness.
Conclusion
Our experiences suggest that conditions can be embraced,
particularly if they are considered fair, a proxy for good
parenting, achievement and merit, and enable community
members to take an active role in the programme and not sit
back as passive recipients of aid. We conclude that cash transfer
programmes can make considerable progress in overcoming
some of the unintended consequences they may present, if
community members participate in their design and implemen-
tation, giving them the opportunity to mould and shape cash
transfer programmes in ways that benefit them and fit their
social landscape.
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